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1Abstract
In this paper we introduce and test the hypothesis that the relation between
in°ation and unemployment has been in many countries subject to a signi¯cant
change in the early 1990's after the disin°ation period. That period began between
1975 and 1980 after the ¯rst (or the second) oil price shock in autumn 1973. During
the disin°ation period, in°ation and unemployment were the result of the struggle
between the wage and price setters trying to in°uence the distribution of income
to their favour and the Central Bank ¯ghting against in°ation. Since the wage
and price setters did not fully believe in an \unconditional" pursuit of the anti-
in°ationary policy, the result was a gradual decline of the in°ation rate rendered
possible by a rising rate of unemployment.
Our hypothesis was inspired by the observation that the statistical Phillips curves
are now rather °at in many countries. If such horizontal Phillips curves will also
result when they are estimated taking into account the most important other factors
in°uencing the in°ation rate (mainly supply shocks) they may be explained by the
hypothesis that during the 1990's, wage and price setters ¯nally accepted the new
rigour of the monetary policy and tried no more (nor had the market power { due
to increasing globalisation and international competition) to pursue a policy which
raises the in°ation rate signi¯cantly above the target in°ation rate of the Central
Bank. In that case a "break" in the parameters of the Phillips- Curve should be
observed.
We use econometric methods to test whether the presumed \break" in the re-
lation between in°ation and unemployment can be shown to exist. We restrict
our study to the four largest countries of the Euro area (Germany, France, Italy
and Spain), the UK and the USA. The result are very di®erent for the countries;
therefore we intend in a further step to detect the reasons for there divergences.
JEL: E10, E50, C22, C32.
Keywords: Phillips curve, unemployment, in°ation, wage and price setting, Central
Bank, structural break.
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3In a ¯rst section, statistical Phillips curves for the six countries are considered and
a brief history of the Phillips curve is given along these charts. In a second section, we
look at the actual discussion and report that the literature on the Phillips curve, on the
natural rate of unemployment (NRU) and on its empirical counterpart (the NAIRU) took
account of the developments up to the early 1990s by progressing from the unique to a
time-varying NAIRU and underlines the di±culties to measure the NAIRU. Conseqently,
some authors returned to the theory of a long-run downward sloping Phillips curve.
In Section 3 we develop our hypothesis about the slope of the Phillips curve during
the last 13 to 15 years which implies that in the last decade the idea of a Nairu has lost
its meaning since the rate of in°ation now is determined (at least over the cycle) by the
Central Banks irrespectively of the rate of unemployment.
As these statistical Phillips curves do not consider other variables which might in°u-
ence the relation between in°ation and unemployment, we test econometrically to what
extent the picture remains unchanged when other in°uences (esp. supply shocks) are
taken into account. This is the object of Section 4.
In Section 5 we discuss three recent contributions to various topics.
In Section 6 the paper concludes with ¯nal remarks.
1 A short history of the changing relation between in°a-
tion and unemployment
Beginning with the years following the second oil price in autumn 1979 the statistical
Phillips curves of most countries are marked by a negative relation between the rates
of unemployment and of in°ation. Chart 1 shows this for the four great countries of
the Euro Area, for the UK and for the United States. Their Phillips curves start about
1975/1980 with low rates of unemployment (except in Italy and in Spain) and they
¯nish all with distinctively lower rates of in°ation. We measure the in°ation rate by
the GDP de°ator which has the advantage to exclude that part of the in°ation which
results from the pass-through of higher import prices to the prices of the commodities
produced within the country (Phillips curves measured by other price indicators are
given in annex A.3 on p. 35 { they are not fundamentally di®erent except for the years
4of large import price movements).
The in°ation rates in 1975/80 are strongly in°uenced by the ¯rst oil price shock in
autumn 1973 which brought to an end the phase of near full employment and of the
corresponding vertical long term Phillips curve (natural rate µ a la Friedman). During
that time, this \natural" rate was considered to be stable even if Friedman had explicitly
stated that it must not be constant but may change for structural reasons.
After the second (in some countries after the ¯rst) oil price shock, in°ation decreased
and unemployment increased - mainly as the result of the struggle between the wage and
price setters trying to in°uence the distribution of income to their favour and the Central
Bank ¯ghting against in°ation. Since the wage and price setters did not fully believe
in an \unconditional" pursuit of the anti-in°ationary policy, the result was a gradual
decline of the in°ation rate rendered possible by a rising rate of unemployment. This
kind of explanation based on the behaviour of (collective) wage setters and (individual)
price setters is often called \Keynesian".
The period of declining in°ation rates ends in the early 1990s. Afterwards, i.e. during
the last 13 to 15 years, Chart 1 shows more or less constant in°ation rates without a
marked trend (Germany excepted). This change in the relation between in°ation and
unemployment is clearly to distinguish.
5Chart 1: Phillips curves for Germany, France and Italy, quarterly data from 1970/1980
to 2006
6Chart 1 (continued): Phillips curves for Spain, the UK and the USA, quarterly data
from 1960/1980 to 2006
Sources: OECD (EcoWin), own calculations. In°ation is measured in terms of the GDP De°ator.
72 The fate of the NAIRU and its implications for the Phil-
lips curve
The concept of the NAIRU claims that there exists a certain rate of unemployment (the
NAIRU) where the rate of in°ation does not change. When the actual unemployment
rate lies beneath or above the NAIRU an accelerating or decelerating rate of in°ation
will result. However, for the acceleration case the theoretical arguments are much more
convincing and empirical examples are easier to ¯nd than for the opposite case. A
continuous accelerating decline in the rate of in°ation is rarely observed and it would
be di±cult to reconcile it with all theories supporting the downward rigidity of prices
and wages. Therefore it is more prudent to de¯ne the NAIRU as the minimum rate of
unemployment at which the rate of in°ation does not rise.
In the high days of the natural rate of unemployment (NRU) hypothesis it was
supposed that the NAIRU { considered as its empirical counterpart { was determined
by the structural features of the economies studied and hence considered as constant.
But at the end of the 1990's it had become evident that the NAIRU is not time-invariant
and is therefore di±cult to estimate. All articles published in the \Journal of Economic
Perspectives"-Symposium in 1997 share this view:
1. Gordon (1997) states the time-varying nature of the NAIRU in its title and he
mentions the di±culties to measure it. Nevertheless he writes (p. 28) \Uncertainty
about the value of the NAIRU is not so large as to render the NAIRU concept
useless".
2. Staiger, Stock & Watson (1997) underline that the NAIRU has changed and is
di±cult to measure: \the most striking feature of these estimates is the lack of
precision" (p. 34). Therefore the authors ¯nd that although unemployment is a
useful indicator of in°ation over the next year, other leading indicators of in°ation
are better. \The recent debate over whether the NAIRU is currently by 6 percent
or 5.5 percent does little to inform monetary policy". (loc. cit. p. 34)
3. Blanchard & Katz (1997) already know that it is varying over time and ask what
are the reasons for these changes. They see many candidates but to their opinion
\the magnitude of the increase, the diversity of labor market institutions and of
policies should have helped to identify culprits. Yet, while many suspects have
been identi¯ed, none has been convicted". (p. 52)
84. Stiglitz (1997) emphasizes the interaction between actual unemployment and the
NAIRU. One of his conclusions is: \high unemployment is even worse than we
thought because it raises the NAIRU, and lower unemployment is better than we
thought, because it lowers the NAIRU". (p. 8)
5. Only one out of these articles concluded that it is \time to ditch the NAIRU"
(Galbraith 1997).
Some years later Laubach (2001, p. 220) states that \in general, the results of his
empirical analysis [...] con¯rm those of Staiger et al. (1997) for the United States [...] that
the measured uncertainty around the NAIRU estimates is large" and he raises doubts
what these estimates measure: \The ¯nding that information from unemployment data
greatly improves the precision of the NAIRU estimates raises the question whether these
estimates are in fact linked to in°ation, or just smoothed unemployment series."
Most adherents to the view that the NAIRU is determined by structural features of
the economy tried to identify structural changes which augmented the NAIRU (often
called the equilibrium rate of unemployment). Most prominent in this area of research
is the OECD (1994) Jobs Study and its \OECD Jobs Strategy". The 10 commandments
of this strategy (see OECD 2006, p. 24) concern mainly changes in the labour market
and social institutions supplemented by enhanced product market competition, a better
framework for the creation and di®usion of technological knowledge and by an anti-
in°ationary macroeconomic policy (this point had nothing to do with a macroeconomic
policy in the Keynesian sense, aiming at an expansion of the demand for commodities).
Since the e®orts to identify structural changes were often not successfull because
the regulations considered became mostly less rigid, i.e. changed in the wrong direction,
some authors { esp. from the USA { saw the main source for a change in unemployment
on the demand side. For example Ball (1997) analyses the disin°ation period from 1980
to 1990 in the OECD-countries and states: \The main cause of rising unemployment
was the tight monetary policy that most OECD countries pursued to reduce in°ation"
(p. 168). As Stiglitz (1997), he argues that the disin°ation resulting from this policy
causes via hysteresis a rise in the NAIRU.
The argumentation based on structural changes became still more di±cult when,
beginning with 1992-93, the rate of unemployment began to decline in the USA and UK
without an increase of the rate of in°ation (some years later this also happened in the
9countries of \old Europe") and it became necessary to explain a decrease of the NAIRU.
Adherents to the NRU-hypothesis tried this again and added hitherto unmentioned
structural changes. A prominent example is given by Katz & Krueger (1999), who
propose four factors to explain the recent decline in the rate of unemployment below
the estimated NAIRU combined with reduced wage pressure and low in°ation for the
US labor market, namely:
- Favorable demographic trends
- Improved e±ciency in matching workers with jobs
- Greater anxiety about job security
- Increase in the prison population
The last item is speci¯c to the US but the ¯rst three could be relevant also for the
European countries. The ¯rst is analysed in section 5.
What does the coincidence of declining in°ation rates and rising rates of unemploy-
ment imply for the Phillips curve? It does not imply a shift in the Phillips curve. This
can be seen by looking at a stylised representation of the disin°ation period considered
by Ball (1997). In Chart 2 we observe at its beginning the point A and at its end the
point B. Two shapes of the Phillips curve may lay behind it:
Chart 2: Long-run Phillips curves (LRPC)
10According to the NRU hypothesis the vertical long-run Phillips curve (LRPC-F) and
the NAIRU should have shifted to the right: In 1980 it corresponded to the level u80,
in 1990 to the level u90. According to the Keynesian theory of the Phillips curve, the
downward-sloping LRPC-K remained unchanged. A and B are two points on the same
LRPC (F stands for Friedman and K for Keynes).
Contrary to the dominating structural change argumentation, Akerlof, Dickens &
Perry (1996) returned to the non-linear LRPC which is rather °at at high rates of
unemployment but remains in the domain of positive values of the rate of in°ation.
Essential for their model and their empirical analysis is the downward rigidity of wages,
whose role becomes smaller when the in°ation rate is higher. In 2000, these three
authors added a new argument pretending that at low rates of in°ation, their impact is
too small to be taken into consideration. They call this a \near-rational wage and price
setting behaviour". Astonishingly they did not repeat their argumentation of 1996 and
invented a very special shape of the non-linear LRPC.
Another - and more convincing - explanation of the price-setting behaviour at low
rates of in°ation can be found in Taylor (2000, p. 1389), who argues that \the decline in
pass-through or pricing power is due to the low in°ation environment that has recently
been achieved in many countries" (p. 1389). This explanation has the advantage not to
lead to the very special LRPC derived in Akerlof, Dickens & Perry (2000).
The existence of the downward-sloping LRPC is supported by Karanassou, Sala &
Snower (2003) (KSS 2003) for Europe. KSS (2003) use data for the years 1970 to
1998 and reach the conclusion \that the EU faces a long-run in°ation-unemployment
trade-o®".
For Germany, Franz (2005) reaches the conforming conclusion for the period 1972 to
2002 that \the coe±cient associated with the sum of lagged in°ation rates is well below
unity in all estimated Phillips curves... It means that strictly speaking there exists no
such thing as a vertical Phillips curve" (p. 146).
To explain their results, KSS (2003) propose a new theoretical formulation for the
long-run downward sloping Phillips curve instead of its traditional Keynesian interpre-
tation, which is expressed by KSS (2003) in its simplest form as:
¼t = a¼t¡1 ¡ but + c + "t (1)
11KSS (2003, p. 96) argue that this interpretation has received \no proper microfoun-
dations". From a methodological point of view, it may be asked: Why needs a curve
to be founded on microeconomic maximizing behaviour which produces the results of
collected bargaining agreements concluded between collective bodies on both sides of
the labour market? Whatever the answer may be it is useful to present the micro-
foundation chosen by KSS (2003) and to discuss whether their implications contradict
the considerations based on the \traditional" Keynesian interpretation of the Phillips
curve1.
KSS (2003) provide their model with a \rigorous microfoundation" based on price
and wage sluggishness with respect to changes in the money growth rate. The \price
sluggishness parameter" a < 1 is called the \only substantive ad hoc simpli¯cation" of
the model. Thanks to these lagged reactions a change in the money growth rate has
permanent real e®ects.
We leave aside the question in what sense the assumption of sluggish reactions may
be seen as \rigorous microfoundation", esp. since the individual price setting behaviour
is not analysed, but described with the help of an ad hoc simpli¯cation. We restrain
ourselves to consider the implications for the Phillips curve. The two most interesting
implications are: The long-run Phillips curve is °atter
{ the greater is the price sluggishness parameter a
{ the greater is the wage sluggishness parameter b
We shall return to these implications in the next section.
1This \traditional" interpretation is not based on money illusion. When Phelps (1967) and Fried-
man (1968) developed the expectation-augmented Phillips curve, they introduced { without attracting
attention to it { a very severe restriction in setting the parameter a in equation (1) to unity. This
implies that workers and entrepreneurs always have the market power to pass-through price increases
to nominal wages and wage increases to prices respectively. In this special case the \accelerationist
hypothesis" necessarily always holds, because with a = 1 equation (1) becomes the following ¯rst order
di®erence equation ¢¼t = c ¡ but + "t. Therefore if a = 1 there exists only one unique value of the
unemployment rate u where the in°ation rate does not change, namely u
¤ = c=b.
123 A °at Phillips curve after the disin°ation period?
The return of Akerlof et al. (1996 and 2000), KSS (2003) and Franz (2005) to the
downward-sloping LRPC is an important step in explaining the disin°ation period up
to the nineties. In the literature, allusion is made to a °attening of the Phillips curve.
But is this su±cient to explain the years of relatively constant rates of in°ation following
thereafter? In the KSS (2003) paper the °attening of the Phillips curve implies that the
sluggishness parameters became very large: Wages and prices lag inde¯nitely behind
changes in the money growth; instead they are set in such a way that the in°ation rate
remains constant.
Also Staiger, Stock & Watson (2001) address the question, what happened to the
slope of the Phillips curve, after having observed that the statistical Phillips curve for the
USA remains °at from 1993 to 1998. Their answer is, that \the evidence suggests that
the price Phillips curve has shifted in, not °attened out"(p. 5). This result is questionable
because the authors substitute the rate of unemployment by the unemployment gap,
de¯ned as the \deviation of the actual rate of unemployment from an (unexplainable)
univariate (stochastic) trend rate of unemployment". If the trend is well measured,
any °attening of the Phillips curve tends to disappear. Moreover they have to admit
that \our regressions using the state data fail to isolate any economic or demographic
determinants of the trend unemployment rate" (p. 6).
We want to go one step further and to discuss the hypothesis that there has been a
break in the wage and price setting behaviour in the early 1990's. This break may be
due to a strengthened position of the Central Banks, whose new vigour in the pursuit of
their in°ation target is now taken very seriously by the wage and price setters, and by
a reduced market power of the wage and price setters, due mainly to the globalization
of goods and labour markets; See Section 5.3.
4 Econometric analysis
The traditional Phillips curve with adaptive expectations is estimated in this part. An
overview of the empirical literature is ¯rst made, then the modelling and testing strategy
is presented and at least the results are presented on a concentrated way.
134.1 Econometric strategy
4.1.1 Overview of single-equation-Phillips curves in the literature
There are several competing forms of the (single-equation-)Phillips curve: Gordon's tri-
angle model is the most \consensual" for the traditional Phillips curve i.e. with adaptive
expectations (Gordon 1981, Gordon 1997, Eller & Gordon 2003):
¼t = ®(L)¼t¡1 + ¯(L)(ut ¡ u¤
t) + ±(L)Zt + "t (2)
where the Z-Variables are de-meaned and de-trended supply-shock variables (oil & food;
exchange rate; price control, tax and minimum-wage e®ects;...). The NAIRU is modelled
as a constant or a random walk (within a ML-estimation). In Gordon (1981) the level
of unemployment and its ¯rst di®erence are included, instead of the unemployment gap.
Most estimations of such a Phillips curve (Gordon included) imposes the restriction
®(1) = 1, what is equivalent to estimate the equation in terms of the ¯rst di®erence of
in°ation (¢¼t is then the endogenous variable) and to rule out a long-run non-vertical
Phillips curve. This is the most used speci¯cation and the one used by international
organisations like the OECD, the ECB and the European Commission (Richardson,
Boone, Giorno, Meacci, Rae & Turner 2000, Fabiani & Mestre 2001, McMorrow &
RÄ oger 2002).
Another speci¯cation, also quite consensual, can be taken from Staiger et al. (2001)):
¢¼t+1 = c0 + ®(L)¢¼t ¡ ¯(L)(¢wt ¡ ¢prod¤
t¡1 ¡ ¼t¡1)
+°0Xt + °(L)¢Xt + ±(L)Zt¡1 + "t+1 (3)
The most important departure from the ¯rst speci¯cation with the restriction ®(1) = 1
lies in the presence of the cointegration term (¢wt ¡ ¢prod¤
t¡1 ¡ ¼t¡1) coming from
a wage equation not reported here. Note here that the cointegration is expressed in
terms of the di®erenced variables; Staiger et al. argue that the levels do not seem to
be cointegrated in their data set. X is the unemployment gap or output gap (from a
univariate ¯lter method). The Z are, as in Gordon, some de-meaned and de-trended
supply-shocks variables.
The idea of introducing a cointegrating term comes from Blanchard & Katz (1997,
p. 62) and from Sargan (1964):
¢wt = c0 + ¢¼t¡1 ¡ ¸(wt¡1 ¡ prodt¡1 ¡ pt¡1) ¡ ¯ut (+±Zt) + "t (4)
14Here the cointegration term is expressed in levels. They interpret its signi¯cance as
evidence for labour market theories other than the neo-classical one (e±ciency wages,
hysteresis with insider/outsider features) where the reservation wage is in°uenced by
productivity.
A \new" strand in the estimation of the Phillips curve, and alternative to the \tra-
ditional" Phillips curve presented above, is proposed along the New-Keynesian theories:
¼t = ¯¼e
t+1 + ®Xt + "t. Xt is { depending on the authors { the output gap, the unem-
ployment gap or the de-trended real unit labour costs. But the Phillips curve derived
from them is far from beeing satisfactory (even when supply shocks are added as in
Roberts 1995). Whereas the microfoundations are well derived, the implications of the
models theoretically as well as empirically are problematic. Mankiw & Reis (2002) listed
the main arguments against such Phillips curves:
1. A credible and long announced disin°ation would produce an economic boom
against the admitted stylized facts (Ball 1994).
2. The persistency of in°ation is not explained through theses models. Only the
addition of some backward-looking terms reconcile them with the data (Fuhrer &
Moore 1995).
3. The models cannot reproduce the lagged and spread impact of monetary shocks
on the economy, what is also admitted as a stylized fact (Mankiw 2001).
Moreover one can ¯nd quite strong evidence against the hypothesis of rationality for
survey data on household and expert in°ation expectations; See Nielsen (2003) for Eu-
ropean data and Grant & Thomas (1999) for US data.
All these objections let us discard this kind of speci¯cations and prefer the \tradi-
tional" Phillips curve.
154.1.2 Our single-equation speci¯cations
Following the literature we estimate two types of \traditional" Phillips curves for each
country that take the forms:
¼t = a0 +
8 X
i=1
®i¼t¡i + ¯0ut +
8 X
i=1
¯i¢(ut¡i) + ±0¼oil
t +
8 X
i=1
±i¢¼oil
t¡i
+µ0¼
prod
t +
8 X
i=1
µi¢¼
prod
t¡i + "t (5)
¢¼t = a0 ¡ ¸[¼t¡1 ¡ ¯0ut¡1 ¡ µ0¼
prod
t¡1 ¡ b0trend]
+
8 X
i=1
®i¢¼t¡i +
8 X
i=1
¯i¢ut¡i +
8 X
i=0
±i¢¼oil
t¡i +
8 X
i=1
µi¢¼
prod
t¡i + "t (6)
These two types di®er from each other as follows:
1. In the ¯rst speci¯cation (equation 5) we estimate the Phillips curve in levels, on
the contrary to most of the existing literature, because we explicitly do not want to
rule out a priori the possibility of a downward-sloping long-run Phillips curve. The
long-run slope is then equal to ¯0=(1 ¡
P
i ®i). Therefore these two coe±cients
¯0 and
P
i ®i are of special interest here. If the ¯rst is zero then the long-run
Phillips curve is °at, if the second is equal to one then it is vertical. If the ¯rst is
negative and the second below one, then the long-run Phillips curve is downward-
sloping. The long-run elasticity of the in°ation rate w.r.t. the productivity growth
is equal to µ0=(1¡
P
i ®i). Most authors would expect a zero-coe±cient, or if any
a negative one. But as the Philips curve is a reduced form from a wage-setting
and a price-setting equations, the sign is not given a priori2. We do not expect
the change of the oil price to have a permanent e®ect on in°ation (±0=(1¡
P
i ®i))
and thus expect an insigni¯cant coe±cient for ±0.
2. The second speci¯cation { albeit not very far from the second in spirit { is closer
in its formulation to the standard model as it is expressed in ¯rst di®erence of
the in°ation rate. We follow the way of Blanchard & Katz (1997) in including an
error correction term. This is superior to the standard speci¯cation (equation 2
2A positive coe±cient means that the wage-setters pass a greater amount of productivity growth in
their wages than the price setter in their prices. A negative coe±cient the opposite. A zero coe±cient
means that the proportion of productivity passed in the wages and the prices resp. is equal.
16with ®(1) = 1) because it takes into account that the main variables (the in°ation
rate, the unemployment rate and perhaps the productivity growth) are I(1) and
may be cointegrated. On the second hand it allows not to rule out a priori the
possibility of a non-vertical Phillips curve; Indeed two coe±cients are of interest
here. The loading coe±cient ¡¸ measures strictly speaking the adjustment speed
to past deviations from equilibrium (encompassed by the cointegration relation)
(Johansen 1995). If this coe±cient is signi¯cant, it tells us two things; ¯rst that
the cointegration exists (or at least between two of the variables) and second
that it in°uences the in°ation developments (i.e. the in°ation rate is not weakly
exogenous). The second coe±cient of interest is the long-run elasticity of the
in°ation rate w.r.t. the unemployment rate (¯0). It tells us if it is signi¯cant
negative (and provided that the loading coe±cient is signi¯cant) that the long-run
Phillips curve is downward-sloping. If it is zero, there is no long-run Phillips-
curve. Then only the degree of integration can tell whether the Phillips curve
is °at (in°ation I(0) and unemployment rate I(1)) or vertical (in°ation I(1) and
unemployment rate I(0)) or just not existing at all (both being I(1) or I(0))3.
Here an alternative step is performed: the cointegration relationship is estimated
in level and the residuals are tested for unit roots. This gives a rapid and ¯rst
insight of the possible breaks and which coe±cient they likely may hit. 4
4.1.3 The data and their statistical properties.
We choose to express the in°ation rate in terms of the GDP de°ator because it turns
o® the imported in°ation (provided the higher prices are past over to the customers).
Almost all authors we have cited before estimate at least one speci¯cation in terms of
the GDP de°ator for the same reason.
The unemployment rate is based on the national de¯nition rather than on the ILO
de¯nition because of two reasons. First, the national de¯nition is more precise because it
is based on an exhaustive statistic of the unemployed (the ILO series are based generally
3In all countries, the in°ation rate and the unemployment rate are found I(1) for the maximal sample.
4After the method of Engle & Granger (1987); the cointegration exists if the resulting estimated
residuals are I(0). Special t-critical values should then be used for the ADF-test. As then OLS is super-
consistent, the estimated elasticities can be interpreted as usual and do not su®er from simultaneous-
equation bias for large samples. However as for the error-correction single-equation, OLS is ine±cient
and the usual t-stats should not be used.
17on a yearly poll that is choked on the national de¯nition and revised when new ¯gures are
known) and this unemployment rate is much more commented through the press than the
ILO one. One can fairly say that a larger part of the population in each country knows
the level of the survey-based unemployment rate than the level of the ILO rate. Second,
most of the ILO times series are not available for long samples (see annex A.1 for a
detailed report of the sample availability). Some authors consider speci¯c unemployment
rates to account for demographic shifts (only for certain categories like middle-aged
men or \Perry-weighted" rate that hold the demographic structure of the labour force
constant). The demographic e®ects for the countries we consider are explorated in the
Section 5.1 and it can be seen there that these e®ects are negligible for all countries.
Therefore we restrain ourselves to the genuine unemployment rates.
For the choice of the exogenous supply-shock variables we leaned ourselves on the
existing literature and the common admitted stylised fact that the slowdown of the
productivity growth in the Western countries and the oil shocks (1974, 1979, 1990,
1999, 2003-...) are the major economic supply shocks since 1970. We include therefore
these two shocks in the Phillips curve.
More technically, the data we focus on are seasonally adjusted quarterly data; yearly
data are available on a quite large sample but they may yield { from an estimation point
of view { a more evident simultaneous bias. Even if quarterly data do not rule out a
priori this problem, the induced bias may be smaller. Monthly data are available only
for half of the data of interest (unemployment rate and oil prices). The GDP-de°ator
and the productivity series are not available on a monthly basis and it is in our view
preferable to estimate the Phillips curve in controlling for labour productivity changes
and in terms of the GDP-de°ator. Therefore we are obliged to estimate on a quarterly
basis. Our variables are de¯ned as follows:
² ¼: The in°ation rate is measured as the yoy-percentage growth rate of the GDP
de°ator (DPGDP). Source: Eurostat.
² u: The unemployment rate (UR) is the survey-based or national de¯nition unem-
ployment rate. Source: OECD (EcoWin-Reuters).
² ¼oil: The yoy-change in the price of oil in national currency (DOIL). Source: IMF-
IFS (EcoWin-Reuters).
² ¼prod: Labour productivity yoy-growth rate (DPROD, real GDP per person in
18employment). Source: OECD (EcoWin-Reuters), Eurostat.
The data covers all countries for the period 1980q1-2006q3. In some of them the
covered period is but longer (USA and UK: 1960q1/2-2006q3; France and Germany:
1970q1-2006q3).5
The in°ation rates for all six countries considered and all periods (see Table 4 in the
annex, p. 35) are I(1), as well as the unemployment rates. The changes in the price of
oil are I(0). For the growth rate of labour productivity, the ¯gures are not clear-cut.
Precise de¯nitions, sources and details on the statistical properties are in the annex (A.1
on p. 32®).
Granger causality tests within bivariate VARs (with a constant, a deterministic
trend and if necessary impulse dummies for outliers in the in°ation equation, di®er-
ent lag-lengths) were conducted between all variables and the in°ation rate. Especially
interesting are the results for the unemployment rate6. We look at two samples: the
1980-2006 sample and the 1995-2006 sample. The results can be summarized as follows:
- 1980-2006: In all countries the causal direction from the unemployment rate to
the in°ation rate cannot be rejected at the 10%-level (USA: all lag-lengths and
even at the 1%-level; UK: all lag-lengths and even 5%-level; Germany: all lag-
lengths; Spain: only at some lag-lengths), with exception of France { where only
the inclusion of the 70's permits such an a±rmation { and of Italy7.
- 1995-2006: The evidence is weaker and mostly disappears completely (USA: only
for a lag-length of 7 and with signi¯cance level 5%; UK: no evidence at 10% but
for lag-length 8; Germany: no evidence at 5% but for lag-length 8; France: no
evidence at 10% but for lag-length 5; Italy: no evidence at the 5%-level, but at
the 10%-level for some lags; Spain: no evidence at the 10%-level).
From the Granger-tests it seems already that something happens to the Phillips
5The statistical break due to the German Reuni¯cation is solved as follows: ¯ctive whole German
levels are calculated backward from the ¯rst level of reuni¯ed German ¯gure (1991q1) and the growth
rate of the original West-German ¯gures.
6Results for the other variables are available on request.
7Depending if the sample begins in the early 80's or the late 80's, and which lag-length is chosen,
the ¯gures are not clar-cut.
19curve in all countries between the 80's and 90's and in the way we postulated it: the
relation becomes weaker if it not disappeared.
We estimate each country separately for two reasons; the ¯rst one is that we do not
think that all countries have exactly the same breakpoint dates, as can be suggested
from the charts on p. 6, and in general have common coe±cients. Indeed even though
the convergence due to the European integration is certainly observed it is not completed
yet. It began for Italy and Spain in 1993, for France perhaps sooner in the 80's. Since
the UK still has another cyclical development, it cannot really be spoken of European
convergence. Germany faces the big statistical and economic break of the Reuni¯cation
that did not hit the other European countries in the same strength. Thus it seemed not
advisable to us to estimate a common Phillips curve for the \old European" countries
in a panel estimation. Second, data were available in di®erent lengths (UK, Germany
and France from at least the 70's; Italy and Spain only from 1980 onward; USA from
even 1960 onward) that renders a panel estimation quite di±cult if one does not wish
to forego data.
4.1.4 Stability tests used for detecting possible breakpoints
For the determination of the eventual presence of structural breaks, we follow the usual
literature (Hansen 2001), in performing F-tests like the Chow- and Quandt-tests, RSS-
tests, CUSUM and CUSUM2 and looking at the recursive and rolling estimates of coef-
¯cients of interest.
The tests used are constructed as follows:
Chow- or Quandt-test: The sample is parted in two subsamples, whereas the parting
time date or breakpoint goes from a time point t1 to another t2. Following Hansen
(1997) these two time points are chosen as to imply a 15% symmetric trimming. For
t going from t1 to t2, a Chow-test is performed and the respective Wald-statistics and
F-statistics are stored, as our models are linear they will not di®er except for a constant
factor term. Three possible Quandt-statistics are possible as in Andrews (1993) and
Andrews & Ploberger (1994): the maximal F-statistic, the exponential average of all F-
statistics and the simple average of the F-statistics. For all a p-value can be derived from
Hansen (1997). We look however only at the ¯rst one. The data where the statistics
are maximal give then the possible break-point(s). These statistics are now computed
20in the version 6 of EViews and were used here. This test assumes homoskedastic errors
in the whole sample. This is why we perform also the next test.
RSS-Test: The same splitting method as above is used and for both subsamples a
regression is performed and the estimated residual sum of squares (RSS) are stored and
added together (Hansen 2001, p. 121f). A plot of the overall RSS give insight for possible
breakdate(s) (local and global minima). Here the assumption of homoskedasticity is
released and provide an alternative if the homoskedasticity tests do fail.
CUSUM and CUSUM2: Using ever larger subsets of the sample data, the equation is
estimated at each step and the estimated coe±cients used to perform a one-step-forecast.
Both tests are based on the obtained series of one-step-ahead and standardized forecasts
errors, precisely on their cumulative sum. They are provided standardly in any statistical
packages. Here the plots performed by EViews are used and the statistics are computed
after Brown, Durbin & Evans (1975). When the statistics are outside the con¯dence
bounds, there is an indication for instability; The CUSUM testing for overall parameter
stability whereas the CUSUM2 for variance stability.
Recursive coe±cient estimates: are provided by EViews also. The equation is esti-
mated repeatedly, using ever larger subsets of the sample data. For each estimations the
estimate of the coe±cient(s) of interest is stored and pictured with the 95% con¯dence
bounds. According to EViews, \If the coe±cient displays signi¯cant variation as more
data is added to the estimating equation, it is a strong indication of instability."
Rolling coe±cient estimates: The equation are estimated over a window of 10 years
or 40 observations, starting from the soonest possible to the latest. All coe±cients
with their respective p-values are stored and the short-run (¯0) as well as the long-run
(¯0=(1 ¡
P
®i) or ¯c
0) elasticities w.r.t. unemployment are commented.
As in some countries obvious outliers could be identi¯ed the estimations are per-
formed including a dummy variable correction for these outliers.
4.2 Single-equation estimations: results
In a ¯rst table (Table 1), the results from the stability tests described above are sum-
marized (a more detailed description can be obtained from the authors). From these
21results it can be seen that for each country a breakpoint in the ¯rst half of the 90's
can be found. From this evidence the two sepci¯cations were re-estimated for the two
sub-samples { before and after the detected breakpoint. The results of this second step
are presented in Table 2.
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23Table 2: Results of some equations
Country Equation 5 Equation 6
and H0: =1 H0: =0 H0: =0 H0: =0 H0: =0#
time period
P
i ®i ¯0 l-t e. ¡¸ ¯0
Germany
1971q1-1989q4 0.822*** -0.086*** -0.487*** -0.093 -0.506
1994q1-2006q3 0.837*** -0.074* -0.451** -0.182*** 0.117
Breakpoints: 1992-93 + 2000 1993-94
France
1971q1-1989q4 0.921*** -0.118*** -1.498*** -0.112** -2.963**
1991q1-2006q3 0.803*** -0.100*** -0.508*** -0.218** -0.628***
Breakpoints: 1979-83 + 1990 1982-83 + 1990
Italy
1981q1-1994q4 0.838*** -0.172** -1.059*** -0.166*** -6.110***
1996q1-2006q3 0.751*** -0.004 -0.014 -4.338*** -2.523***
Breakpoints: 1995-97 + 2001-03 1995-96 + 2000
Spain
1981q1-1994q4 0.845*** -0.221*** -1.427*** -0.321*** 0.071
1996q1-2006q3 0.729*** -0.033*** -0.120*** -0.344*** -0.322***
Breakpoints: 1995 1997
UK
1961q2-1973q4 1.021 0.470** -22.693 >0 {
1976q1-1987q4 0.784*** -0.220** -1.019*** -0.137 -0.594***
1990q1-2006q3 0.758*** 0.080** 0.331*** -0.327*** -0.216
Breakpoints: mid 70's + 1980 + 1986 mid 70's + 1981 + 1987
USA
1960q1-1974q4 1.157*** 0.161*** -1.022*** -0.041 2.42
1977q1-1989q4 1.072*** -0.329*** 4.579*** -0.101 -2.160***
1991q1-2006q3 0.857*** 0.054* 0.376** -0.037 -0.113
Breakpoints: 1976-77 + 1981 + 1990-91 1975 + 1981 + 1986
l-t e. Long-term elasticity (¯0=(1 ¡
P
i ®i))
*/**/*** Reject H0 at the 10% / 5% / 1% level.
no star Not signi¯cant (do not reject H0)
# The distribution are non-standard and unknown.
Here the N-distribution is used and thus subject to caution.
244.3 Summary of results
Compared to the statistical Phillips curves which are °at in 5 of our 6 chosen countries
during the last ten to thirteen years, the results of our econometric analysis are partly
disappointing. We start with three positive aspects of our results:
1. The stability tests (Table 1) con¯rm the existence of the expected break in the
Phillips curve in all six countries during the 1990's. Only in the UK the latest
break is found for 1986. The year(s) of the break in the 1990's are estimated
by equation (5) as follows: USA and France: 1990; Germany: 1993/94; Spain:
1995-1997; Italy: 1995-2001. The break points resulting from equation (6) di®er
slightly, but they are less reliable because in three countries no cointegration is
found, for all or a part of the periods considered.
2. The results summarized in Table 2 show that - with the exception of the USA
before 1990 - there does not exist any vertical Phillips curve after the beginning
of the disin°ation period. The relevant parameter is signi¯cantly below unity for
that period (except the USA) and for the actual period.
3. In three countries of romance languages, namely France, Italy and Spain, equation
(5) indicates a °attening of the estimated Phillips curve; in Italy it is °at since
1996. The results of equation (6) con¯rm these results except for Spain where ¯0
is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
The less successful results of our econometric analysis are:
4. In Germany there is not much change in the slope of the Phillip curve. In the UK
we obtain a °attening of this curve between the disin°ation period and the later
period. But since 1990 the Phillip curve is sloping slightly upward what we are
not yet able to explain.
5. For the USA the results are rather strange what con¯rms the results of other
empirical studies (Beyer & Farmer 2002, for example).
6. Equation (6) which includes an error correction term o®ers no great help, since
esp. in the countries without the expected results too often no cointegration is
found. This might be due to the relative small sample size (40 to 50 quarters).
255 On three recent contributions to speci¯c topics
5.1 Demography and NAIRU; a 30-years-assessment
Some authors claim that the NAIRU could have changed just because of demographic
shifts in the active population (Stiglitz 1997, Ball & Mankiw 2002, Wall & ZoÄ ega 2004)8;
groups with di®erent unemployment rate (esp. along gender and age) could have experi-
enced shifting weights. Along gender and age two contradictory e®ects can be supposed:
As the women participation to the labour force gets larger and their relative unemploy-
ment rate is in general higher than for men, it could induce a statistical increase of the
unemployment rate. On the other hand, as the population is getting older in Europe
and especially in Germany (2004 was the ¯rst year of decreasing overall population!), the
share of younger workers, with generally higher unemployment rate9, in the labour force
gets smaller and induce therefore a statistical decrease on the unemployment rate. This
is why some Phillips curves estimations are done with at least two types of unemploy-
ment rates: the o±cial ¯gures and one corrected for demographic e®ects. Staiger et al.
(1997) take for example the unemployment rate for young men only, Ball & Mankiw
(2002) a \Perry-weighted" unemployment rate.
It is open to discussion whether it is admissible to use this kind of argument since it
implies that the overall rate of unemployment is the weighted result of the di®erent sub-
group rates. On the contrary the average of these rates may be determined by the overall
rate of unemployment. Nevertheless we try to gauge this e®ect for Germany, France,
Italy, Spain and the UK. For that we follow the method of Ball & Mankiw (2002), named
\Perry-weighted", which divides the labour force in subgroups (gender/age) and let their
respective shares ¯ctively ¯xed over the period considered whereas their unemployment
rates are the original ones. The induced ¯ctive new unemployment rate gives therefore
the possible e®ects of the gender/age-shifts e®ects on the unemployment rate and give
thus an idea of their possible e®ects on the NAIRU. Here it assumed implicitely that
8Stiglitz (1997) measures this e®ect for the USA with 1/3 of the decline of the NAIRU, the latest
being accounted with 1.5 %-points between the early 1980's and 1995. To the same modest e®ect come
Ball & Mankiw (2002) for the period 1960-2000 and for the USA. Wall & ZoÄ ega (2004, p. 30) measures
the e®ect of demographic changes on the US NAIRU between 1982 and 2000 with 0.7%-points in 2000.
9Here the speci¯cities of Germany should be mentioned. On the contrary to other continental Eu-
ropean countries and to the UK and USA, the unemployment rate of younger workers in Germany as
the one of women is not signi¯cantly higher than the average rate of unemployment in Germany. The
speci¯c dual education system is often put forward to explain this positive feature.
26these structural e®ects were not corrected by overall reaction of the unemployment rate
(e.g. if the total unemployment rate depends on total demand for goods).
For Germany 10 age groups (15-19; 20-24; 25-29 ;30-34; 35-49; 40-44; 45-49; 50-54;
55-59; 60-65) and the two gender are considered, so that the labour force is divided
in 20 groups. Data are only available for a longer period from the Mikrozensus (after
1975) and thus di®er from the o±cial ¯gures of the German Labour Agency, as the
de¯nition for being unemployed is much more in line with the one of the ILO than the
administrative one. The di®erent pictures are shown in Chart 3. The maximal di®erence
for the 1975-2005 period is as high as +0.5 percentage points (2005) and -0.3%-points
(1987). Even more than for the USA, the gender/age structural shifts of the labour
force can thus be considered as negligible.
For the other European countries, data from the Eurostat-Labour Force Surveys
between 1983 and 2006 are considered. Five age groups (15-24; 25-39; 40-49; 50-59 and
60+) and the two genders parted the labour force. The di®erent pictures are shown in
Chart 4. The maximal positive e®ect (increase of the NAIRU) lies between 0 and 0.6
%-points and at the beginning of the sample (1984-91). The maximal negative e®ect
(decrease of the NAIRU) is much higher for all countries and lies between -0.5 and -1.5
%-points and is achived at the end of the sample (2005-06, for France also 1997). The
demographic e®ects on the NAIRU are somehow more important for the other European
countries than for Germany but are still relatively modest if one compares these ranges
with the maximal fall in their resp. unemployment rates (5.5 to 15.7 %-points).
5.2 Role of institutions: the OECD-Employment Outlook 2006
In its Employment Outlook 2006, the OECD sta® once again tries to prove the impor-
tance of institutional changes for the evolution of the unemployment rate. Therefore,
the changes of the latter from 1982 to 2003 are explained by ¯ve structural factors and
by the output-gap with the results that the output-gap contributes much less to the
changes in unemployment than the structural factors (OECD 2006, Chart 7.3 on p.
214).
This may suggest that structural factors contribute more than the macroeconomic
27Chart 3: Demographic e®ects on the German unemployment rate (in %)
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environment to the explanation of the changes in unemployment. But this is not the
case, since only the output gap (i.e. the deviation from trend output) and not the output
itself is included as an explanatory variable. Therefore the in°uence of the growth
performance of a country is not taken into account. The importance of this omission
can be demonstrated for the most extreme case, Ireland, where the unemployment rate
diminished by almost 8%-points. This change in the OECD-calculations is attributed to
almost 90% to structural factors, only the small rest to the output gap. The well-known
extraordinary growth performance in Ireland has no chance to show its in°uence on the
rate of unemployment. We suppose it would be overwhelming.
With respect to the single structural factors it is shown that in the OECD-average
higher average replacement rates, higher tax wedges and lower product market competi-
28Chart 4: Demographic e®ects on the unemployment rate (in %) for 4 European countries.
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tion signi¯cantly raise unemployment. Employment protection and union density have
a very small and non-signi¯cant e®ect. On the contrary, active labour market policies
(ALMP) tend to lower unemployment.
5.3 Globalization and in°ation
Several studies look at the role of globalization (i.e. growing importance of international
trade) for the Phillips curve. In a recent cross-countries comparative study from the
International Monetary Funds (IMF 2006, chap. 3) the °attening of the Phillips curves in
29the 90's is con¯rmed for all industrialized countries. To measure whether this change can
solely be attributed to a better conduct of the monetary policy or also to globalization
the IMF develop an original strategy.
The IMF (2006, chap. 3) ¯nds that the persistency of in°ation diminished from 1983
to 2004. The estimated Phillips curve for the G8-countries between 1960-2004 takes the
form:
¼ = c0(credibility) + ®(credibility)¼t¡1
+¯(credibility;d±openess;Wage ¡ Coord;PastInfla)GapDom
+±Xsupply + ² (7)
The overall ® and ¯ coe±cients have decreased over the sample. The credibility
variable has a negative sign and is signi¯cant for the constant and the ®-coe±cient. To
account for the decrease of the ¯ coe±cient, only the degree of openess is signi¯cant.
This means that both { improved monetary policy and globalization { have contributed
to the °attening of the Phillips curve. The IMF quanti¯es the improved monetary policy
(credibility) to have contributed to half of the declined sensivity of prices to domestic
product, the increased openess of the economies accounting for the rest.
To summarize the ¯ndings, we join Bean (2006) { the Executive Director and Chief
Economist of the Bank of England { which states in his LSE-speech, that globalization
seem to have supported the trend of declining in°ation but cannot be seen as the major
driving force behind it.
6 Conclusions
Impressed by the development of the statistical Phillips curve of the USA, the UK and
the four great countries of the Euro Area, we formulated the hypothesis that during the
early 1990's the wage and price setters ¯nally accepted the new rigour of the monetary
authorities and tried no more (nor had the market power) to pursue a policy which raises
the in°ation rate signi¯cantly above the target in°ation rate of the Central Banks. As
a consequence the long-run Phillips curves not only °attend a bit but are °at now.
Our econometric analysis which takes account of the most important factors which
30in°uence also the in°ation rate (esp. supply shocks like productivity growth and oil price
hikes) con¯rms that (except for the USA before 1990) there does not exist any vertical
Phillips curve after the beginning of the disin°ation period. Further more, a \break" in
the Phillips curve is con¯rmed for all countries during the early or middle 1990s (only in
the UK it occurs already in 1986). The late apperance of the break in Italy and Spain
may be related to the strong e®orts of these countries to ful¯ll the Maastricht criteria
for entrance in the EMU.
With respect to the slopes of the Phillips curves, it is shown that the clear-cut picture
given by the statistical Phillips curve in Chart 1 does not survive the inclusion of other
explanatory variables: the in°uence of the unemployment rate on the rate of in°ation
does only disappear in Italy: The Phillips curve is °at in that country since 1996. In
the other countries it becomes °atter.
The next steps of our reserach will be designed to explain the di®erences between
the countries considered to determine the reasons for the observed behaviour. It would
especially be useful for the monetary authorities to know whether the factors which led
to the °attening of the Phillips curve are rather permanent or only transitory.
31A Annex
A.1 Description of the data
The data are quarterly data. The abbreviations are as follows:
Table 3: Description of the data.
Variable
Name
Description
PGDP De°ator of the Gross Domestic Product. Eurostat (national Account
statistics); seasonally adjusted quarterly series. The in°ation rate from
this series is built as the yoy-growth rate in %.
HUR Harmonised Unemployment Rate in %. Eurostat; seasonally adjusted
monthly series.
SUR Standardised Unemployment Rate in %. OECD, seasonally adjusted
quarterly series.
UR Unemployment Rate in %. (used for the estimations) OECD, season-
ally adjusted quarterly series.
NEER Nominal E®ective Exchange Rate. From the IMF-IFS-Database;
1957q1-2006q3; 2000=100. The growth rate for this series is built
as the yoy-growth rate in %.
LProd Labor productivity (real GDP per person in employment), index
(2000=100), seasonally adjusted.
OIL USD Oil Price in USD (average of crude). IMF-IFS; 1957q1 2006q4.
² Germany
PGDP: Destatis (1970-2006). 1970-1990: West-Germany, linked with qoq-growth
rates. 2000=100.
HUR, SUR, UR: UR: national de¯nition and from 1969q1 to 2006q4. SUR: from
1978q1 to 2006q3. HUR: from 1992q2 to 2006q4.
LProd: Destatis (1970-2006). 1970-1990: West-Germany, linked with qoq-growth
rates. 2000=100.
² France
32PGDP: Eurostat (1978 onward) and IMF-IFS (1970-1977). From 1970q1 to
2006q3.
HUR, SUR, UR: (Insee and Dares for last points) UR: national de¯nition and
from 1967q1 to 2006q4. SUR: from 1982q1 to 2006q4. HUR (=SUR): from
1983q2 to 2006q4.
LProd: Eurostat, OECD and IMF. From 1970q1 to 2006q3.
² Italy
PGDP: From 1980q1 to 2006q3.
HUR, SUR, UR: UR: national de¯nition and from 1960q1 to 2006q3; but break in
the de¯nition from 1992q4 onward (UR=SUR). SUR: from 1982q1 to 2006q2.
HUR (=SUR): from 1983q1 to 2006q3. The break wa suppressed from the
UR-series in re-linking its level after 1993 with its changes before (the evolu-
tion is the same but at a lower level).
LProd: OECD-Economic Outlook. From 1970q1 to 2006q3.
² Spain
PGDP: From 1980q1 to 2006q3.
HUR, SUR, UR: UR: national de¯nition and from 1964q2 to 2006q3. SUR: from
1982q1 to 2006q3. HUR(=SUR): from 1983q1 to 2006q4.
LProd: OECD-Economic Outlook. From 1970q1 to 2006q3.
² UK
PGDP: From 1955q1 to 2006q3.
HUR, SUR, UR: UR: national de¯nition and from 1960q1 to 2006q3. SUR: from
1982q1 to 2006q3. HUR(=SUR): from 1983q1 to 2006q4.
LProd: Eurostat and OECD-Economic Outlook. From 1960q2 to 2006q3.
² USA
PGDP: From 1947q1 to 2006q3.
HUR, SUR, UR: UR=SUR=HUR: from 1960q1 to 2006q4.
LProd: Eurostat and BLS. From 1948q1 to 2006q3.
33A.2 Unit root tests
The unit root tests were performed on the levels and ¯rst di®erence of the data. The
test used is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. A constant was always included
and a variant with a trend also was performed. All tests are performed routinely by
EViews. The results are summarized in the table below; Details as well as the ERS-tests
can be obtained from the authors on request.
Table 4: ADF-tests
Variable name Country level di®erence Remarks
Variable name Country level di®erence
¼PGDP DEU *** ** With SIC-lag selection: ***/-
FRA *** *
ITA * * Trend-stationary
ESP *** - Trend is necessary
UK *** -
USA *** -
UR DEU *** -
FRA *** -
ITA *** -
ESP *** ***
UK *** -
USA *** -
NEER DEU *** -
FRA *** -
ITA *** ***
ESP *** -
UK *** -
USA ** - a trend is necessary
¼NEER DEU * -
FRA - -
ITA *** -
ESP - -
UK * -
USA * -
|continued next page|
34Table 4: ADF-tests
Variable name Country level di®erence Remarks
OIL USD *** -
¼OIL - -
LabourProd DEU *** -
FRA * to *** -
ITA *** -
ESP *** to '- - to *** depending if trend or not...
UK *** -
USA *** -
¼LabourProd DEU *** -
FRA * to '- -
ITA * -
ESP ** -
UK - -
USA ** to '- -
- Reject H0 at 1%: I(0)
* Do not reject H0 at 1%
** Do not reject H0 at 5%
*** Do not reject H0 at 10%: I(1)
From this table it is clear that the in°ation rates for all country and all indicators
are non-stationary (I(1)), as well as the unemployment rate. The changes in the price of
oil are stationary (I(0)). For the growth rate of labour productivity and of the nominal
e®ective exchange rate, the ¯gures are not clear-cut.
A.3 Phillips curves: di®erent price indices
The Phillips curves that arise from these data are pictured in the following charts. It is
obvious from the charts that the USA behaves much more conform to the \traditional"
theory than the (main) European countries.
35Chart 5: Phillips curve: Germany.
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Chart 6: Phillips curve: France.
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36Chart 7: Phillips curve: Italy.
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Chart 8: Phillips curve: Spain.
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37Chart 9: Phillips curve: UK.
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Chart 10: Phillips curve: USA.
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